Japan andSpain | European Council on Foreign Relations
Dec 6, Contact between Japan and Spain began when a Jesuit missionary, Since the restoration of diplomatic relations in , both countries have. Japan–United States relations refers to international relations between Japan and the United States of America. Relations began in the late 18th and early 19th . Dec 12, is the year that marks the th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Spain in Over the.
The war also left a residue of anti-American sentiment in Spain,  whose citizens felt a sense of betrayal by the very country they helped to obtain the Independence against the British. Many historians and journalists pointed out also the needless nature of this war, because up to that time, relations between Spain and the United States had always enjoyed very amiable conditions, with both countries resolving their differences with mutual agreements that benefited both sides, such as with the sale of Florida by terms of the Treaty of Amity.
Nonetheless, in the post-war period, Spain enhanced its trading position by developing closer commercial ties with the United States. During the s and s, the United States Army developed a number of color-coded war plans to outline potential U. All of these plans were officially withdrawn in They are wedded to their ways and much inertia must be overcome before they will adopt machinery and devices such as are largely exported from the United States.
If the price of modern machinery, not manufactured in Spain, is increased exorbitantly by high customs duties, the tendency of the Spanish will be simply to do without it, and it must not be imagined that they will purchase it anyhow because it has to be had from somewhere.
He called the United States "a colossal child: His collection of poems Poeta en Nueva York explores his alienation and isolation through some graphically experimental poetic techniques. Coney Island horrified and fascinated Lorca at the same time. Brian Morris, "suffuse two lines which he expunged from his first draft of 'Oda a Walt Whitman ': This was in line with both American neutrality policies, and with a Europe-wide agreement to not sell arms for use in the Spanish war lest it escalate into a world war.
Congress endorsed the embargo by a near-unanimous vote. Only armaments were embargoed; American companies could sell oil and supplies to both sides. Roosevelt quietly favored the left-wing Republican or "Loyalist" government, but intense pressure by American Catholics forced him to maintain a policy of neutrality.
The Catholics were outraged by the systematic torture, rape and execution of priests, bishops, and nuns by anarchist elements of the Loyalist coalition. This successful pressure on Roosevelt was one of the handful of foreign policy successes notched by Catholic pressures on the White House in the 20th century. The Soviet Union provided aid to the Loyalist government, and mobilized thousands of volunteers to fight, including several hundred from the United States in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion.
All along the Spanish military forces supported the nationalists, and they steadily pushed the government forces back. Byhowever, Roosevelt was planning to secretly send American warplanes through France to the desperate Loyalists.
His senior diplomats warned that this would worsen the European crisis, so Roosevelt desisted. The American-owned Vacuum Oil Company in Tangierfor example, refused to sell to Republican ships and at the outbreak of the war, the Texas Oil Company rerouted oil tankers headed for the Republic to the Nationalist-controlled port of Tenerife and supplied tons of gasoline on credit to Franco until the war's end.
American automakers FordStudebakerand General Motors provided a total of 12, trucks to the Nationalists. Although not supported officially, many American volunteers such as the Abraham Lincoln Battalion fought for the Republicans, as well as American anarchists making up the Sacco and Vanzetti Century of the Durruti Column.
Edgar Hoover persuaded President Franklin D. This fascination with Japanpredominated, over time, amongst the more conservative classes in Spanish society, such as military men.
While on the one hand, Spain was a European country that belonged to Western civilisation, its weak colonisation of the Philippines and the precarious stability of Spanish domestic policies ensured that the Japanese viewed the Spanish with a certain amount of disdain, in much the same manner as the northern European nations regarded those of Southern Europe.
Assimilating ideas that were then in vogue about racial miscegenation during the Arab occupation, the prejudicial effects of hot climates on the characters of people and other such notions, the overall panorama of ideas associated with Spain was a melange of an occidental and orientalist vision: Both nations represented the other as semi-Oriental, via contradictory lenses that enabled each of them, within this civilisational scale that was so prevalent at the time, to feel superior to the other.
Inwhen the wars in Spain and in China happened to coincide, the Spanish both Republicans as well as Nationalists felt, for the first time in a long while, that they were affected by events that took place in the territory of the other nation. This reciprocal interest continued untilalthough it underwent a dramatic change in nature because, while the early period was characterised by amicable relations, the final phases of World War II were marked by Spanish hatred for the Japanese.
This study will analyse this period of renewed attention, focusing upon the Franco supporters on the Spanish side and the Japanese militarists. Starting with a description of the events that took place, this article attempts an interpretation based on perceptions of why such a dramatic change took place, from the initial friendship to the hatred of later years. The anti-communist alliance The Sino-Japanese war and the Spanish Civil War were the two main conflicts that took place before World War II; in addition, they occurred simultaneously at the two geographical extremes of the Eurasian continent, as was noted at the time.
The quest for allies in similar situations resulted in both the Spanish nationalists as well as the Japanese militarists deeming the conflicts to be similar and feeling themselves to be in a parallel situation, proclaiming that they were engaged in a common struggle against international communism. When viewed through these lenses, the Spaniards felt the Japanese triumphs to be their own and the conquests of Chinese cities were utilised for purposes of domestic propa-ganda.
The Japanese militarists shared this vision, however, they preferred to use the friendship with Spaniards instead to educate themselves on Spanish soil about the advances in Soviet armaments, especially with regard to the new M tank. Spain was an obvious candidate to join but General Franco and his foreign minister, Jordana, resisted such a move, on account of which these three nations decided to apply pressure individually.
In this manner Japan and Spain became allies although, very soon after, the political orientation of the anti-Communist countries did an abrupt volte-face. The struggle against democracies In spite of the changing significance of having signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, common Hispano-Japanese interests later expanded as they coincided in the new Axis drive against democracies. While Japan revamped its government and tried to draw closer to the democracies, Spain and Italy sided vehemently with Finland in its struggle against the Soviet invasion thus opposing German policy.
Franco’s Spain and the Japanese Empire () – Florentino Rodao
From the summer of onwards, this sentiment of participating in a joint struggle against the same enemies reverberated amongst these erstwhile signatories to the Anti-Comintern Pact, the result being a new agreement, the so-called Tripartite Pact, formed again by Japan, Italy and Germany. This time they joined their efforts against the democracies aimed especially at countering the growing involvement of the United States. And so, Spain joined a month later, albeit secretly, after a meeting between Franco and Hitler in Hendaye.
This Hispano-Japanese political alliance, although an indirect one, entailed efforts to obtain Navycerts permits issued by the British Royal Navy to foreign vessels allowing them to transport goods and an exchange  of products via a -quite ineffective- Commercial Treaty. Also, when Japan sought to substitute raw materials that had been blocked by the United States, a so-called Spanish Economic Mission was invited along with other delegations from Latin America, apparently in order to buy mercury, but this Mission never produced results.
In the political sphere, Spain bet heavily onChina for a final triumph of the pro-Japanese government headed by Wang Jingwei and in June the Spanish Economic Mission was the first foreign delegation to officially visit him. The Japanese militarists were still undecided whether to confer diplomatic recognition and rely exclusively on Wang or to keep on trying to attract the Nationalist Party of Jiang Jie-shi.
Efforts were also made to co-operate in terms of propaganda, both in Latin America as well as in those areas of Asia that had been occupied by Japan, however yet again the results were negligible. Once again, undoubtedly, the results of Hispano-Japanese relations during the early phases of World War II occurred within the realm of perceptions.
Both nations assumed a parallel posture: Furthermore, they were the two most important trump cards of the Axis powers in their struggle against the enemy, since Tokyo and Madrid held the key to the conquest of two crucial posts for the definitive defeat of the British Empire: Therefore it became relatively common to simultaneously refer to Spain and Japan together during the most victorious moments of the Axis powers, both in Allied documentation as well as in that of the Axis powers.
This association between Spain and Japan was later reflected on by the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, who noted in his diary an account of the phone call from his German counterpart, Joaquim Von Ribbentrop inviting Italy to join the War against the United States.
Ciano ended his notes with an unanswered question: Tokyo ended up by being involved in the worldwide conflict while Madrid did not. Spain continued its policy of Non-Belligerence, which could  be interpreted as a step preceding its entry into the war, as was the case of Italy, although its final outcome was different.
The Spanish involvement was at a different level, which is the reason why the Pacific War once again raised the level of relations with Japan, since mutual friendship now began to have definite objectives that were far more concrete and furthermore, could have been crucial for the result of the conflict.
Tokyo relied upon Spain to provide it with raw materials, to achieve a greater acceptance in the Philippines, to obtain intelligence and to represent its interests in the more difficult countries. The impact of this cooperation was uneven. The exchange of raw materials and Spanish political co-operation to achieve a wider domination over the Philippine population during the Japanese occupation had varying results.
There is evidence of a fair number of unsuccessful attempts but, in any case, the volume of any such transactions would have been rather small because the quantities of products to be transported would have been minimal. As for the occupation of the Philippines, the Spanish consul inManila handed over a list of Spanish leftists for their detention, while the Japanese strove to propagate statements by Spaniards extolling their achievements.
The Falangists in Manilamanaged to attain dominance over the Spanish colony, substituting the hegemony of pro-Franco oligarchic families suspicious of Fascism but, apart from this, few benefits were had. The Japanese military police Kempeitaifor instance, did not prolong the detention of those Spaniards denounced by the consul in Manila, and Spain never managed to obtain any important measure that signified a noteworthy favour for the community. The media in the Philippines on its part circulated some messages of support from the Spanish administration, and the Japanese religious policy managed some praise from the Spanish Catholic missionaries that could help to achieve the acquiescence of the Filipino people for the military occupation, but its importance was relative.
Intelligence and the representation of Japanese interests witnessed the most significant results of this Spanish co-operation. This scheme failed within the space of a few months. He deceived the British ambassador in Madrid, Samuel Hoare, but later was unmasked and had returned to Spain. It had at least one agent on US soil and used the Spanish diplomatic bag, but it severely lacked resources to work properly, such as a method of receiving instructions from Spain on a regular basis.
All in all, Japanese intelligence acquired through Spain was meagre and not entirely trustworthy; however, due to the lack of alternatives, the Japanese continued using it until The representation of interests in countries at war or without official relations with Japan was an undertaking of great magnitude.
Representing almost all of the Western Hemisphere except for Guatemala and Mexico, the task entrusted to Spanish diplomacy was greater than the one accepted by Sweden and Switzerland and therefore an important opportunity to enhance Spanish diplomacy.
The reasons for this  solicitude, however, were directly related to the cover they provided to the intelligence effort.
The forced transfer of Japanese citizens in the United States to War Relocation camps induced Japan to seek out secret contacts with her subjects in enemy territory and the pressing need for intelligence seems to have been the reason that Spain was duly elected to represent Japanese interests.
In it, he informed the Ambassador of the decision and followed requesting him to provide information about Spaniards who were not classed as fifth columnists, so that they could be appointed as representatives throughout the country.
Franco’s Spain and the Japanese Empire (1937-1945)
Madrid and Tokyo saw eye to eye on the issue of relegating the well-being of the Japanese in the United States in favour of a better espionage network. Hispano-Japanese cooperation soon encountered a fair number of obstacles. The most pressing one was the occupation of the Philippines, the former colony where Spain still retained important economic interests that were highly profitable thanks to exports to the United States.
In fact the largest company in the Philippines had its headquarters in Barcelona while many wealthy Spanish citizens owned tobacco and sugar plantations. During the first month of the Pacific War news of Japanese air-attacks and the destruction in Manila combined with the growing pressure exerted by the United States against pro-Axis Spanish temptations had important repercussions in Spain.
On its part, the Japanese government felt frustrated due to the expectations it had nurtured with regard to the Spaniards, especially about the representation of Japanese expatriates. Tokyo never received the expected news via Spanish channels about the mistreatment of Japanese subjects abroad which was so essential for the Japanese propaganda efforts to showcase racial discrimination against its subjects, one of its favourite themes.
Spanish diplomats and other personnel entrusted with this representation of interests were reluctant to transmit intelligence messages or those that were  liable to be used for propaganda and, furthermore, they also collaborated with the Americans to minimise the information about difficulties, including deaths. It was only when the first vessel of exchange arrived in Japan, organised jointly by Spain and Switzerland, the leading representatives of Allied interests in Asia and of Japanese interests in America, that Japanese propaganda was finally able to use the news on mistreatment that so greatly needed and, with it, criticisms surfaced about the lack of dedication on the part of the Spanish diplomats.
Moreover, in Septemberan important mainstay of friendly relations with Japan disappeared in Madrid. The San Francisco Peace Treatysigned on September 8,marked the end of the Allied occupation, and when it went into effect on April 28,Japan was once again an independent state, and an ally of the United States. Economic growth in the United States occurred and made the Automobile industry boom in After the occupation[ edit ] Main articles: This equality, the legal basis of which was laid down in the peace treaty signed by forty-eight Allied nations and Japanwas initially largely nominal.
A favorable Japanese balance of payments with the United States was achieved inmainly as a result of United States military and aid spending in Japan. Self-confidence grew as the country applied its resources and organizational skill to regaining economic health. This situation gave rise to a general desire for greater independence from United States influence.
During the s and s, this feeling was especially evident in the Japanese attitude toward United States military bases on the four main islands of Japan and in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying the southern two-thirds of the Ryukyu Islands. The government had to balance left-wing pressure advocating dissociation from the United States allegedly 'against the realities' of the need for military protection.
Recognizing the popular desire for the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Bonin Islands also known as the Ogasawara Islandsthe United States as early as relinquished its control of the Amami group of islands at the northern end of the Ryukyu Islands.
But the United States made no commitment to return Okinawa, which was then under United States military administration for an indefinite period as provided in Article 3 of the peace treaty. Popular agitation culminated in a unanimous resolution adopted by the Diet in Junecalling for a return of Okinawa to Japan. Military alliance and return of territories[ edit ] Bilateral talks on revising the security pact began inand the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington on January 19, When the pact was submitted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it became the subject of bitter debate over the Japan—United States relationship and the occasion for violence in an all-out effort by the leftist opposition to prevent its passage.
It was finally approved by the House of Representatives on May Japan Socialist Party deputies boycotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the LDP deputies from entering the chamber; they were forcibly removed by the police.
Massive demonstrations and rioting by students and trade unions followed. These outbursts prevented a scheduled visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusukebut not before the treaty was passed by default on June 19, when the House of Councillors failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days after lower house approval.
It was understood, however, that Japan could not come to the defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces overseas Article 9. In particular, the constitution forbids the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces.
Accordingly, the Japanese find it difficult to send their "self-defense" forces overseas, even for peace-keeping purposes. The scope of the new treaty did not extend to the Ryukyu Islands, but an appended minute made clear that in case of an armed attack on the islands, both governments would consult and take appropriate action.
Notes accompanying the treaty provided for prior consultation between the two governments before any major change occurred in the deployment of United States troops or equipment in Japan. Unlike the security pact, the new treaty provided for a ten-year term, after which it could be revoked upon one year's notice by either party.
The treaty included general provisions on the further development of international cooperation and on improved future economic cooperation. Both countries worked closely to fulfill the United States promise, under Article 3 of the peace treaty, to return all Japanese territories acquired by the United States in war. Inthe Okinawa reversion issue and Japan's security ties with the United States became the focal points of partisan political campaigns.
In Juneafter eighteen months of negotiations, the two countries signed an agreement providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in But new issues arose. In Julythe Japanese government was surprised by Nixon's dramatic announcement of his forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China.
Many Japanese were chagrined by the failure of the United States to consult in advance with Japan before making such a fundamental change in foreign policy.
The following month, the government was again surprised to learn that, without prior consultation, the United States had imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, a decision certain to hinder Japan's exports to the United States. Relations between Tokyo and Washington were further strained by the monetary crisis involving the December revaluation of the Japanese yen. These events of marked the beginning of a new stage in relations, a period of adjustment to a changing world situation that was not without episodes of strain in both political and economic spheres, although the basic relationship remained close.
The political issues between the two countries were essentially security-related and derived from efforts by the United States to induce Japan to contribute more to its own defense and to regional security.
The economic issues tended to stem from the ever-widening United States trade and payments deficits with Japan, which began in when Japan reversed its imbalance in trade with the United States and, for the first time, achieved an export surplus. Vietnam War and Middle-East crisis[ edit ] The United States withdrawal from Vietnam in and the end of the Vietnam War meant that the question of Japan's role in the security of East Asia and its contributions to its own defense became central topics in the dialogue between the two countries.
American dissatisfaction with Japanese defense efforts began to surface in when Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger publicly stigmatized Japan. The Japanese government, constrained by constitutional limitations and strongly pacifist public opinion, responded slowly to pressures for a more rapid buildup of its Self-Defense Forces SDF. It steadily increased its budgetary outlays for those forces, however, and indicated its willingness to shoulder more of the cost of maintaining the United States military bases in Japan.
In the United States and Japan formally established a subcommittee for defense cooperation, in the framework of a bilateral Security Consultative Committee provided for under the security treaty.
This subcommittee, in turn, drew up new Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation, under which military planners of the two countries have conducted studies relating to joint military action in the event of an armed attack on Japan. In an Orderly Marketing Arrangement limiting Japanese color television exports to the United States was signed, following the pattern of an earlier disposition of the textile problem.
Steel exports to the United States were also curtailed, but the problems continued as disputes flared over United States restrictions on Japanese development of nuclear fuel- reprocessing facilities, Japanese restrictions on certain agricultural imports, such as beef and oranges, and liberalization of capital investment and government procurement within Japan.
This policy was put to the test in Novemberwhen radical Iranians seized the United States embassy in Tehran, taking sixty hostages. Japan reacted by condemning the action as a violation of international law.
At the same time, Japanese trading firms and oil companies reportedly purchased Iranian oil that had become available when the United States banned oil imported from Iran. This action brought sharp criticism from the United States of Japanese government "insensitivity" for allowing the oil purchases and led to a Japanese apology and agreement to participate in sanctions against Iran in concert with other United States allies.
Japan was prompt and effective in announcing and implementing sanctions against the Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December Inin response to United States requests, it accepted greater responsibility for defense of seas around Japan, pledged greater support for United States forces in Japan, and persisted with a steady buildup of the SDF. Rise of the falcons[ edit ] A qualitatively new stage of Japan-United States cooperation in world affairs appeared to be reached in late with the election of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.
Officials of the Ronald Reagan administration worked closely with their Japanese counterparts to develop a personal relationship between the two leaders based on their common security and international outlook. President Reagan and Prime Minister enjoyed a particularly close relationship.
Nakasone reassured United States leaders of Japan's determination against the Soviet threat, closely coordinated policies with the United States toward Asian trouble spots such as the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States in developing China policy. The Japanese government welcomed the increase of American forces in Japan and the western Pacific, continued the steady buildup of the SDF, and positioned Japan firmly on the side of the United States against the threat of Soviet international expansion.
Japan continued to cooperate closely with United States policy in these areas following Nakasone's term of office, although the political leadership scandals in Japan in the late s i. Bush to establish the same kind of close personal ties that marked the Reagan years.
Spain–United States relations - Wikipedia
A specific example of Japan's close cooperation with the United States included its quick response to the United States' call for greater host nation support from Japan following the rapid realignment of Japan-United States currencies in the mids.
The currency realignment resulted in a rapid rise of United States costs in Japan, which the Japanese government, upon United States request, was willing to offset. Another set of examples was provided by Japan's willingness to respond to United States requests for foreign assistance to countries considered of strategic importance to the West.
During the s, United States officials voiced appreciation for Japan's "strategic aid" to countries such as PakistanTurkeyEgyptand Jamaica. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki 's pledges of support for East European and Middle Eastern countries in fit the pattern of Japan's willingness to share greater responsibility for world stability.
Another example of US-Japan cooperation is through energy cooperation. The government held back from large-scale aid efforts until conditions in China and Indochina were seen as more compatible with Japanese and United States interests.